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ABSTRACT
Post World War II European welfare states experienced several decades of relatively low
unemployment, followed by a plague of persistently high unemployment since the 1970's.
We impute the higher unemployment to welfare states' diminished ability to cope with
more turbulent economic times, such as the ongoing restructuring from manufacturing to
the service industry, adoption of new information technologies and a rapidly changing in-
ternational economy. We use a general equilibrium search model where workers accumulate
skills on the job and lose skills during unemployment.
1. Introduction
During their rst decades, European welfare states exhibited unemployment rates equal
to or less than those of other market economies; but in the 1970's, they suered large
increases in unemployment, which have endured. Figure 1 shows that unemployment
in European OECD countries has from 1983 persistently exceeded the OECD average
by around two percentage points. Higher incidences of long term unemployment have
accompanied higher levels of unemployment. According to Table 1, more than half of
all European unemployment in 1989 was classied as long-term unemployment with a
duration of a year and over, up from less than a third of unemployment in 1979. Table 1
shows that the increasing incidence of long-term unemployment is a problem common to
the European OECD countries.
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In contrast, the United States escaped such a persistent
increase in unemployment, and U.S. long-term unemployment has remained low.
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Figure 1. Unemployment rate in OECD as a per
cent of the labor force. The solid line is unem-
ployment in the European OECD countries and the
dashed line is unemployment in the total OECD.
Source: Data for 1961{1977 are fromOECD (1984a),
and data for 1978{1994 are from OECD (1995).
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A glaring exception to the European unemployment dilemma in Table 1 is Sweden. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1995b) provide an explanation of the Swedish unemployment experience including
the current crisis with more than 13 per cent of the labor force either unemployed or engaged in
labor market programs.
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Table 1: Unemployment and long-term unemployment in OECD
Unemployment
y
Long-term unemployment
(Percentages) (Percentages of total unemployment)
Average Average  6 months  12 months
1974{79 1980{89 1979
z
1989
x
1979
z
1989
x
Belgium 6.3 10.8 74.9 87.5 58.0 76.3
France 4.5 9.0 55.1 63.7 30.3 43.9
Germany 3.2 5.9 39.9 66.7 19.9 49.0
Ireland 8.4 15.2 47.9 82.4 31.8 67.3
Netherlands 4.9 9.7 49.3 66.1 27.1 49.9
Spain 5.2 17.5 51.6 72.7 27.5 58.5
Sweden 1.9 2.5 19.6 18.4 6.8 6.5
United Kingdom 5.0 10.0 39.7 57.2 24.5 40.8
United States 6.7 7.2 8.8 9.9 4.2 5.7
OECD Europe 4.7 9.2 ... ... 31.5 52.8
Total OECD 4.9 7.3 ... ... 26.6 33.7
y
Unemployment is from OECD, Employment Outlook (1991), Table 2.7.
z
Long-term unemployment in 1979 is from OECD, Employment Outlook
(1984b), Table H.; except for the OECD aggregate gures that are averages
for 1979 and 1980 from OECD, Employment Outlook (1991), Table 2.7.
x
Long-term unemployment in 1989 is from OECD, Employment Outlook
(1992a), Table N.; except for the OECD aggregate gures that are from
OECD, Employment Outlook (1991), Table 2.7.
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Various theories have been used to explain the rise in European unemployment. Blan-
chard and Summers (1986) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988) impute the outcome to
\insider-outsider" conicts between employed and unemployed workers that arose in the
highly unionized economies of Europe. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) study the idea that
excessive European hiring and ring costs contributed to higher unemployment. Malin-
vaud (1994) emphasizes a capital shortage in Europe caused by high real wages in the
1970s and high real interest rates in the 1980s. All these explanations assign the problem
to the demand for labor, where the decisions either of employers or of unionized employed
workers sustain a high unemployment rate. In contrast, we focus on the eects of the
welfare state upon the supply of labor. It is well known that high income taxation and
generous welfare benets distort workers' labor supply decisions. However, we believe that
insucient attention has been paid to the adverse dynamics in response to economic shocks
and increasing turbulence in the economic environment.
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One reason for the past lack of emphasis on workers' distorted incentives as an expla-
nation for high European unemployment must have been the scarce empirical support for
such a proposition. As pointed out by OECD (1994a, chapter 8), most earlier empirical
studies have failed to nd any cross-country correlation between unemployment benets
and aggregate unemployment. In fact, there was even a negative correlation between ben-
et levels and unemployment in the 1960s and early 1970s. A common conclusion has
therefore been that generous entitlement programs are not to be blamed for high unem-
ployment rates. However, the same OECD study presents an opposing view and interprets
the time-series evidence as indicating that unemployment rates do respond to benet enti-
tlements but with a considerable lag of 5 to 10 years, and in some cases 10 to 20 years. A
natural question becomes then, why are there such lags between rises in benets and later
sharp rises in unemployment? Our analysis suggests that the lags are purely coincidental,
and the explanation to persistently higher European unemployment from the 1970s is to
be found in a changing economic environment.
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Our analysis will bear out the assertion by Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, page 62)
that the \unconditional payment of benets for an indenite period is clearly a major cause of
high European unemployment." However, our model diers sharply from their framework, which
emphasizes hysteresis and nominal inertia in wage and price setting.
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It is commonly argued that the economic environment has become more turbulent in
the last couple of decades. The oil price shocks of the 1970's and reallocations from man-
ufacturing to services have each put economic turbulence into the industrialized world. In
addition, the spread of new information technologies, declines in government regulation,
competition from newly industrialized countries, and increasing internationalization of the
production, distribution, and marketing of goods and services are rapidly changing the
economic environment. Harris (1993) argues that `globalization' has sped up in the last
two decades and perhaps in the last decade in particular. Gottschalk and Mott (1994)
provide empirical evidence of increased economic turbulence. They show that more earn-
ings instability for individual workers has accompanied the widening earnings distribution
in the U.S. labor market over the 1970's and the 1980's.
Our thesis is that changing economic conditions from the 1970's onward can explain the
high (long-term) unemployment in the welfare states. The formal analysis is carried out in
a general equilibrium search model where workers' skills depreciate during unemployment
spells, and unemployment benets are determined by workers' past earnings.
3
Simulations
of the model bring out the sensitivity of the equilibrium unemployment rate to the amounts
of skills lost during unemployment. The analysis attributes the welfare states' persistently
higher unemployment from the 1970's to increased turbulence in the economic environment,
while also explaining how lower unemployment rates in the 1950's and the 1960's were
sustainable under more tranquil economic conditions.
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The next section extends our earlier model (Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1995a) by intro-
ducing a stochastic technology for skill accumulation and depreciation. Section 3 describes
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The notion of unemployment compensation should be interpreted broadly in our framework.
The welfare states have various programs assisting individuals out of work. For example, totally
disabled persons in the Netherlands in the 1980s were entitled to 70 % (80 % prior to 1984) of
last earned gross wage until the age of 65 { after which they moved into the state pension system.
At the end of 1990, disability benets were paid to 14 % of the Dutch labor force and 80 % of
them were reported to be totally disabled. (See OECD, 1992b.)
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Our analysis agrees with the basic conclusion in a recent OECD study and policy report
(1994a,b) that \it is an inability of OECD economies and societies to adapt rapidly and inno-
vatively to a world of rapid structural change that is the principal cause of high and persistent
unemployment". But we believe that a greater emphasis should have been put on reforming
benet systems, instead of putting it last among policy recommendations.
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the calibration of the model. We compare the steady state for the welfare state to the
laissez-faire outcome in Section 4. We show how the two economies have very similar
performance under tranquil economic conditions, when the loss of eciency associated
with the welfare state seems minimal. However, compared to the laissez-faire economy,
the welfare state is much more vulnerable to economic shocks and turbulence. Section 5
traces out the impulse-response from an unexpected transient unemployment shock. The
transient shock results in a prolonged period of long-term unemployment in the welfare
state, whereas the recovery is almost immediate in the laissez-faire economy.
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Section 6
demonstrates how persistent economic turbulence leads to higher steady state unemploy-
ment in the welfare state than in the laissez-faire economy. The nal section contains
concluding comments.
2. The Economy
There is a continuum of workers with geometrically distributed life spans, indexed on
the unit interval with births equaling deaths. An unemployed worker in period t chooses
a search intensity s
t
 0 at a disutility c(s
t
) increasing in s
t
. Search may or may not
generate a wage oer in the next period. With probability (s
t
), the unemployed worker
receives one wage oer from the distribution F (w) = Prob(w
t+1
 w). With probability
(1 (s
t
)), the worker receives no oer in period t+1. We assume (s
t
) 2 [0; 1], and that
it is increasing in s
t
. Accepting a wage oer w
t+1
means that the worker earns that wage
(per unit of skill) for each period he is alive, not laid o, and has not quit his job. There is
also a disutility  incurred in each period of work. The probability of being laid o at the
beginning of a period is  2 (0; 1). In addition, all workers are subjected to a probability
of  2 (0; 1) of dying between periods.
Employed and unemployed workers experience stochastic accumulation or deterioration
of skills. There is a nite number of skill levels with transition probabilities from skill level
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Pissarides (1992) analyzes loss of skills during unemployment in a matching model, where it is
also true that a transient shock to unemployment can have persistent eects. Firms are shown to
create fewer jobs after the shock, since they are matching with workers of a lower average quality.
Thus, this is another model of unemployment that is driven by the demand side for labor, while
our paper focuses on the supply of labor in a welfare state.
5
h to h
0
denoted by 
u
(h; h
0
) and 
e
(h; h
0
) for an unemployed and an employed worker,
respectively. That is, an unemployed worker with skill level h faces a probability 
u
(h; h
0
)
that his skill level at the beginning of next period is h
0
, contingent on not dying. Similarly,

e
(h; h
0
) is the probability that an employed worker with skill level h sees his skill level
change to h
0
at the beginning of next period, contingent on not dying and not being laid o.
In the event of a lay o, the transition probability is given by 
l
(h; h
0
). After this initial
period of a lay o, the stochastic skill level of the unemployed worker is again governed by
the transition probability 
u
(h; h
0
). All newborn workers begin with the lowest skill level.
A worker observes his new skill level at the beginning of a period before deciding
to accept a new wage oer, choose a search intensity, or quit a job. The objective of
each worker is to maximize the expected value E
t
P
1
i=0

i
(1   )
i
y
t+i
, where E
t
is the
expectation operator conditioned on information at time t,  is the subjective discount
factor, and 1    is the probability of surviving between two consecutive periods; y
t+i
is the worker's after-tax income from employment and unemployment compensation at
time t + i net of disutility of searching and working.
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Workers who were laid o are entitled to unemployment compensation benets that are
a function of their last earnings. Let b(I) be the unemployment compensation to an un-
employed worker whose last earnings were I. Unemployment compensation is terminated
if the worker turns down a job oer with earnings that are deemed to be `suitable' by the
government in view of the worker's past earnings. Let I
g
(I) be the government determined
`suitable earnings' of an unemployed worker whose last earnings were I. Newborn workers
and workers who have quit their previous job are not entitled to unemployment compensa-
tion. Both income from employment and unemployment compensation are subject to a at
income tax of  . The government policy functions b(I) and I
g
(I) and the tax parameter 
must be set so that income taxes cover the expenditures on unemployment compensation
in an equilibrium.
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Our analysis focuses on how the welfare state aects labor market incentives and eciency in
skill accumulation. We have abstracted from the benets of risk sharing that government policies
can provide when capital markets are incomplete. Adding such considerations would modify our
results, but the forces at work in our analysis would remain.
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Let V (w;h) be the value of the optimization problem for an employed worker with
wage w and skill level h at the beginning of a period. The value associated with being un-
employed and eligible for unemployment compensation benets is given by V
b
(I; h), which
is both a function of the unemployed worker's past earnings I and his current skill level h.
In the case of an unemployed worker who is not entitled to unemployment compensation,
the corresponding value is denoted by V
o
(h) and depends only on the worker's current skill
level. The Bellman equations can then be written as follows.
V (w;h) = max
accept;reject
n
(1   )wh    + (1  )
h
(1  )
X
h
0

e
(h; h
0
)V (w;h
0
)(1)
+ 
X
h
0

l
(h; h
0
)V
b
(wh; h
0
)
i
; V
o
(h)
o
;
V
b
(I; h) = max
s
(
 c(s) + (1    )b(I) + (1  )
X
h
0

u
(h; h
0
)(2)
"
 
1  (s)

V
b
(I; h
0
) + (s)
 
Z
wI
g
(I)=h
0
V (w;h
0
)dF (w)
+
Z
w<I
g
(I)=h
0
max
accept;reject
n
(1   )wh
0
  
+ (1   )
h
(1   )
X
h
00

e
(h
0
; h
00
)V (w;h
00
)
+ 
X
h
00

l
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0
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)V
b
(wh
0
; h
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)
i
; V
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(I; h
0
)
o
dF (w)
!#)
;
V
o
(h) = max
s
n
 c(s) + (1   )
X
h
0

u
(h; h
0
)
h
(1  (s))V
o
(h
0
)(3)
+ (s)
Z
V (w;h
0
)dF (w)
io
:
Associated with the solution of equations (1){(3) are two functions, s
b
(I; h) and w
b
(I; h),
giving an optimal search intensity and a reservation wage of an unemployedworker with last
earnings I and current skill level h, who is eligible for unemployment compensation benets;
and two functions, s
o
(h) and w
o
(h), giving an optimal search intensity and a reservation
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wage of an unemployed worker with skill level h, who is not entitled to unemployment
compensation. The reservation wage of an employed worker will be the same as for an
unemployed worker without benets, w
o
(h), since anyone who quits his job is not eligible
for unemployment compensation.
We will study stationary equilibria, or steady states, for our economy. A steady state
is dened in a standard way, as a set of government policy parameters, optimal policies
(s
o
(h); w
o
(h); s
b
(I; h); w
b
(I; h)) and associated time invariant employment and unemploy-
ment distributions and total unemployment compensation payments that satisfy workers'
optimality conditions and the government's budget constraint. We compute a steady state
as a xed point in the tax rate  . For a xed tax rate  , we solve workers' optimization
problem and use the implied search intensities and reservation wages to deduce stationary
employment and unemployment distributions, and unemployment compensation. A bal-
anced government budget denes a xed point in  , which is associated with a stationary
equilibrium.
7
After having found a stationary equilibrium, we compute various quantities
such as GNP per capita, average productivity of employed workers, average skill level,
average duration of unemployment, and measures of long-term unemployment.
3. Calibration
We set the model period to be two weeks. We set the discount factor  = 0:9985,
making the annual interest rate 4.0 percent. The probabilities of dying and being laid o
are  = 0:0009, and  = 0:009, respectively. The working life of an individual is then
geometrically distributed with an expected duration of 42.7 years. Similarly, the average
time before being laid o (given that the worker has not quit or died) is 4.3 years.
There are 21 dierent skill levels evenly partitioning the interval [1; 3]. All newborn
workers start out with the lowest skill level equal to one. After each period of employment
that is not followed by a lay o, with a probability of 0.25 the worker's skills increase by
one level (0.1 units of skills), and with probability .75 they remain unchanged. Employed
7
The iterative procedure picks the lowest possible  consistent with a stationary equilibrium.
We choose to focus on this the least distortionary tax rate and ignore any higher tax rates that
might be consistent with other steady states. For example, there will always exist another sta-
tionary equilibrium with a 100 % tax rate where all economic activities are closed down.
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workers who have reached the highest skill level retain those skills until becoming unem-
ployed. As a point of reference, someone who starts out working with the lowest skill level
will on average reach the highest skill level after three years and a month, conditional
upon no job loss. The stochastic depreciation of skills during unemployment is twice as
fast as the accumulation of skills. That is, after each period of unemployment, there is
a probability of 0.5 that the worker's skills decrease by one level; otherwise they remain
unchanged. The lowest skill level reached through depreciation is also an absorbing state
until the unemployed worker gains employment. Finally, in a period of being laid o, it is
assumed that the worker keeps his skill level from the last period of employment.
The disutility from searching and the function mapping search intensities into proba-
bilities of obtaining a wage oer are assumed to be
c(s) = 0:5 s ;
(s) = s
0:3
; where s 2 [0; 1] :
The disutility from work, , is set equal to 0:2.
The exogenous wage oer distribution is assumed to be a normal distribution with a
mean of 0.5 and a variance of 0.1 that has been truncated to the unit interval (and then
normalized to integrate to one). Since a worker's earnings are the product of his wage and
his current skill level, it follows that observed earnings fall in the interval [0; 3].
For purposes of awarding unemployment compensation, the government divides the
earnings interval [0; 3] evenly into 15 earnings classes; let the upper limits of these classes
be denoted W
i
, for i = 1; 2; :::; 15. A laid o worker with last earnings belonging to
earnings class i receives an unemployment compensation of 0:7  W
i
in each period of
unemployment. However, the benet is terminated if the worker does not accept a job
oer associated with earnings greater than or equal to 0:7 W
i
. That is, a laid o worker
faces both a `replacement ratio' and `suitable earnings' criterion equal to 70% of the upper
limit of the earnings class containing his own last earnings before being laid o. Newborn
workers and quitters are not entitled to unemployment compensation.
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4. Economic Forces at Work
Given the calibration above, the tax rate that balances the government budget is  =
0:0335. To shed light on the workings of this welfare state (WS), we will now contrast
its steady state to that of a laissez-faire economy (LF), in which there is no government
intervention whatsoever.
Table 2: Steady state values for the WS economy and the LF economy.
WS LF
GNP per capita
y
2.352 2.373
Average productivity of employed
y
2.532 2.533
Average wage of employed 0.882 0.878
Average skill level in the population 2.839 2.864
Unemployment rate 7.11 % 6.33 %
Average duration of unemployment 11.6 weeks 9.4 weeks
Percentage of unemployed at a point in
time with spells so far  6 months 14.0 % 4.7 %
Percentage of unemployed at a point in
time with spells so far  12 months 5.1 % 0.3 %
Discounted expected net consumption
of a newborn worker
z
837.6 844.4
y
GNP and average productivity are computed for the 2-week period.
z
The discounted stream of consumption is net of disutility of
searching and working.
Table 2 shows that the two economies have very similar steady states. Both their pro-
duction and average skill levels are indistinguishable, and the unemployment rate is only
eight tenths of a percentage point higher in the WS economy. As a welfare measure, the
discounted expected net consumption stream of a newborn worker diers by less than six
weeks of per capita GNP (three 2-week periods). We conclude that the eciency costs
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associated with the welfare system are relatively small. However, behind these numbers
lurk important dierences in unemployment dynamics. It is true that the average unem-
ployment spell is very similar across the two economies: 11.6 weeks in the WS economy as
compared to 9.4 weeks in the LF economy. But the WS economy has considerably more
dispersion in the duration of unemployment spells, as indicated by the fractions of long-
term unemployed at any point in time. The percentage of currently unemployed workers
with spells to date greater than or equal to 6 months (12 months) is 14.0 % (5.1 %) in the
WS economy as compared to 4.7 % (0.3 %) in the LF economy.
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Figure 2. Reservation wages in the WS economy of un-
employed workers with unemployment compensation.
The reservation wages are drawn as a function of the
unemployed workers' current skills and their last earn-
ings before being laid o.
Let us now explore the similarities and dierences between the WS economy and the
LF economy by rst looking at unemployed workers' behavior in terms of reservation wages
and search intensities. The reservation wages in the WS economy of unemployed workers
receiving unemployment benets are depicted in Figure 2. The reservation wages are
graphed as a function of the unemployed workers' current skills and their last earnings
before being laid o. Not surprisingly, the reservation wage is a positive function of
last earnings, which determine the level of unemployment compensation. For example,
the reservation wage of someone with the lowest skill level of one, but with the highest
11
possible last earnings, is 0.95. This is an example of a worker who once had attained a
high skill level while making a wage at the top of the wage distribution. If such a worker
with a high unemployment benet happens to lose all his skills due to a prolonged period
of unemployment, he will be extremely picky in terms of the wage oers he will accept. For
the same reason, this worker will also be unwilling to expend too much energy in searching
for a new job. As can be seen in Figure 3, the optimal search intensity of such a worker is
a mere 0.04.
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Figure 3. Search intensities in the WS economy of
unemployed workers with unemployment compen-
sation. The search intensities are drawn as a func-
tion of the unemployed's current skills and their
last earnings before being laid o.
Figure 3 shows also how the search intensity is lower for unemployed workers with
benets and high current skills that have not yet deteriorated due to unemployment.
These workers feel constrained by the government stipulated `suitable earnings'. In fact,
they choose their reservation wages in Figure 2 mostly to avoid violating the rules that
qualify them for unemployment compensation. For them, it is not worth losing a generous
unemployment benet in order to search for a better wage at their own expense. Since the
potential benets of job search are thereby reduced, these unemployed workers respond by
reducing their search intensity and so lowering the utility cost of searching.
8
8
As described, the `suitable earnings' criterion has both a negative and a positive eect upon
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Figure 4. Reservation wages of unemployedwork-
ers without benets drawn as a function of their
current skills. The solid line describes the WS
economy and the dashed line refers to the LF
economy.
Unemployed workers without benets in the WS economy and the unemployed in the
LF economy prefer to choose the maximum search intensity of one. Their reservation
wages can be found in Figure 4. Contrasting Figure 4 to Figure 2 for the WS economy, the
reservation wage of an unemployed worker without benets is always less than or equal
to the reservation wage of an unemployed worker with benets, for any given skill level.
Unemployment spells are of course more costly to the unemployed without unemployment
compensation. Across the WS and the LF economies, there is a slight tendency for higher
reservation wages in the WS economy. An unemployed worker without benets in the
WS economy takes into account the future potential benets from the unemployment
compensation program. It is important for the worker to be vested at a high wage rate
in the event of being laid o. The U-shaped pattern for reservations wages in Figure 4
emerges from the depreciation and accumulation of skills. On the one hand, at the lower
the unemployment level. The induced moderation of unemployed workers' reservation wages tend
to decrease unemployment while any reduction in search intensities increases unemployment. The
former eect outweighs the latter one in the current calibration, and the steady state unemploy-
ment rate in the WS economy would be one percentage point higher without the `suitable earnings'
criterion.
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end of the skill spectrum, unemployed workers have less to lose in terms of skills from an
extended period of unemployment. They therefore tend to choose higher reservation wages
as compared to unemployed workers with skills in the intermediate range. On the other
hand, at the upper end of the skill spectrum, the potential for further skill accumulation
becomes smaller and the emphasis shifts towards the search for higher wages, i.e., the
reservation wage curve starts to slope upward.
As pointed out earlier in Table 2, the dierent reservation wage and search intensity
policies in the WS and the LF economy have only a minor impact on the steady state
outcomes. But there remains an important dierence in the underlying dynamics for
unemployment. Let us take a look at Figures 5.a and 5.b, which depict the distributions
of unemployment over the unemployed workers' current skills and last earnings. These
gures share two prominent features. First, there is a peak of unemployment at the lowest
skill level and the lowest earnings class. This peak is solely composed of newborn workers
who have not yet found a rst job. (There cannot be any laid o workers in this category
since the smallest reservation wage would generate earnings at all skill levels which are in
excess of this earnings class.) Second, both gures display a downward sloping hill at the
higher earnings.
To a large degree, the downward sloping hills in Figures 5.a and 5.b reect a ow of
workers who become unemployed at the highest skill level and work themselves through
the distribution. For every period that a worker remains unemployed, there is a risk of
losing skills. That is, unemployed workers are over time sliding down the hill in the skill
dimension. But we also see how the height of the hill drops when moving towards lower
skill levels, which tells us that more and more of the unemployed workers have found and
accepted new jobs. Less noticeable to the naked eye is that the hill shrinks faster for the
LF economy as compared to WS economy. This accounts for the fact that unemployment
has virtually vanished in the LF economy when we reach the lowest skill level (at the upper
end of last earnings), while some unemployment still survives at this end point in the WS
economy. As we have seen above, the generous unemployment compensation in the WS
economy has the eect of decreasing search intensities and increasing reservation wages.
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Figure 5.a. How unemployment in the WS econ-
omy is distributed over the unemployed workers'
current skills and last earnings.
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Figure 5.b. How unemployment in the LF econ-
omy is distributed over the unemployed workers'
current skills and last earnings.
The eects of dierent search behavior in the LF economy and the WS economy are
illustrated in Figure 6. The gure follows a cohort of workers who lost their jobs after
having reached the highest skill level. At dierent lengths of the unemployment spell, the
curves show the fraction of still unemployed workers who gain employment in the current
2-week period (`hazard rate'). The dashed curve pertains to the LF economy without any
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unemployment compensation benets. Since all unemployed workers in the LF economy
choose the highest search intensity, the shape of the curve is solely determined by how
reservation wages vary with skill levels. Recall from Figure 4 that reservation wages must
initially be decreasing when skills start depreciating from the maximum level. That is,
over time, unemployed workers become more and more concerned about additional losses
of skills. Their willingness successively to reduce their reservation wages explains the rising
hazard of gaining employment during the rst year of unemployment. After a year, the
remaining unemployed have lost enough of their skills that further losses are less of a
concern to them. Their increasing reservation wage policy in Figure 4 translates into a
falling hazard of gaining employment in Figure 6. The hazard of gaining employment in
any given 2-week period levels out at 13.8 % in the LF economy.
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Figure 6. The hazard of gaining employment as
a function of the length of the unemployment spell,
given an initial skill level equal to the highest one.
The curves show the fraction of still unemployed
workers who gain employment in any given 2-week
period after the lay o. The dashed line pertains
to the LF economy; the solid and dotted lines refer
to the WS economy with the workers' last earnings
belonging to the third highest earnings class and the
highest earnings class, respectively.
The solid line in Figure 6 traces the corresponding hazard of gaining employment for
a cohort of workers who become unemployed at the highest skill level in the WS economy
with their last earnings in the third highest earnings class. This group of workers is
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the most numerous one in a steady state, comprising roughly one third of all employed
workers. Over the rst four months, the hazard of gaining employment is quite similar to
that in the LF economy, but thereafter diverges considerably. A long-term unemployed
worker in the WS economy becomes disillusioned, and his prospect of nding a job seems
less attractive over time as compared just to living on his unemployment compensation
benets. As a result, the worker is both raising his reservation wage and reducing his
search intensity, as earlier shown in Figures 2 and 3. The hazard of gaining employment
nally settles down to 3.9 %, which is much smaller than the 13.8 % in the LF economy.
The third dotted line in Figure 6 shows the hazard of gaining employment if the cohort
of laid o workers had last earnings in the highest earnings class. With these even more
generous unemployment benets, the hazard function is naturally lower, and it converges
to a low of 1.1 %. Fortunately, these potential incentive problems have only a small
impact on the steady state of the WS economy, as earlier shown in Table 2. Loosely
speaking, the incentive problems are minor thanks to the relatively low average duration
of unemployment.
5. A Transient Economic Shock
The unemployment dynamics described in the previous section make the WS economy
more vulnerable to economic shocks. This section demonstrates how a transient shock can
cause a prolonged period of long-term unemployment in the WS economy while the LF
economy is more resilient. Specically, we will trace out both economies' responses to an
unexpected transient unemployment shock. We assume that once and for all, the normal
lay o rate of 0.009 rises 20-fold to 0.18 in a single 2-week period at time 0 in the following
gures. Also, everyone who becomes unemployed in this particular period immediately
loses 75 % of his accumulated skills. After this one-period shock, both economies once
again experience the normal lay o rate and rates of skill depreciation and accumulation.
All policy parameters such as taxes and the unemployment compensation program are
kept constant throughout the experiment, which means that the workers' decision rules
stay the same over time, and that the economies will eventually return to their steady
states.
9
9
Let us assume that the extra government expenditures on unemployment compensation in the
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Figure 7. Response in unemployment. The solid
line describes the WS economy and the dashed line
refers to the LF economy.
As can be seen in Figure 7, the unemployment rates in both economies jump up initially
by roughly 16 percentage points. However, the unemployment rates take very dierent
paths thereafter. In the LF economy, the high unemployment rate dies out pretty quickly
when the unemployed workers `bite the bullet' and search intensively for less well-paying
jobs as compared to their lost earnings.
10
In contrast, the WS economy is plagued by a
prolonged period of unemployment since the unemployed workers with their depreciated
skills have diculty nding jobs that dominate their unemployment compensation based
on past earnings. Besides their higher reservation wages, these workers also reduce search
intensities to balance the small prospective gains from search against the utility costs
associated with search.
WS economy are nanced by levying lump-sum taxes.
10
Readers might be curious about the oscillation in the unemployment response in the LF
economy. This outcome is due to the U-shaped reservation wage policy in Figure 4. Workers
who suddenly nd themselves unemployed in the intermediate skill range are accepting low wages
with the intention to quit after having accumulated some skills. Thus, unemployment in the
second year falls below the steady state rate, and rises thereafter once again above the level of
unemployment in the steady state before settling down.
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Figure 8.a. Response in the decomposition of the
unemployed in the WS economy with respect to the
length of their unemployment spells so far. The per-
centage of unemployed workers with at least 6 months
(12 months) of unemployment to date is below the solid
line (dashed line). The percentage above the solid line
is then unemployed workers who have until now been
unemployed for less than 6 months.
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Figure 8.b. Response in the decomposition of the
unemployed in the LF economy with respect to the
length of their unemployment spells so far. The per-
centage of unemployed workers with at least 6 months
(12 months) of unemployment to date is below the solid
line (dashed line). The percentage above the solid line
is then unemployed workers who have until now been
unemployed for less than 6 months.
The drawn out unemployment response in the WS economy is naturally associated
with longer unemployment spells. Figures 8.a and 8.b show how long-term unemployment
gradually emerges after the shock. At any point in time, the gures decompose unemploy-
ment into the fraction of unemployed workers who have to date been unemployed for at
least one year (below the dashed line), those who have so far suered unemployment of less
than a year but at least 6 months (between the solid line and the dashed line), and those
who have until now been unemployed for less than 6 months (above the solid line). Not
surprisingly, both of the rst two measures of unemployed fall at the time of the shock,
since there is a ood of newly laid o workers into unemployment. The two measures then
rise predictably after 6 months and 12 months, respectively. The problem of long-term
unemployment in the WS economy shows up starkly in Figure 8.a. At the peaks of the two
long-term unemployment measures, there is rst a fraction of 61.8 % of all unemployed
workers being unemployed for at least half a year, and later 47.8 % of all unemployed
have to date experienced unemployment for a year or more. In contrast, the corresponding
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numbers for the LF economy in Figure 8.b are 22.9 % and 3.5 %, respectively. Besides the
lower incidence of long-term unemployment, the LF economy shows hardly any persistence
in the fractions of long-term unemployed as compared to the WS economy.
The exogenous jump in the lay o rate and the accompanying depreciation of workers'
skills aect the economies' GNP adversely. Figure 9 shows a sharp drop of around 17 %
in GNP. The faster recovery in the LF economy as compared to the WS economy is due
to the fact that its labor force is returning to work more quickly. Besides a more sluggish
GNP, the resulting long-term unemployment in the WS economy has a negative impact on
the economy's stock of human capital. Figure 10 shows how the average skill level of all
workers continues to decline in the WS economy after the initial shock, and how rebuilding
takes much more time as compared to the LF economy.
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Figure 9. Response in GNP. The solid line describes
the WS economy and the dashed line refers to the LF
economy.
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Figure 10. Response in average skill level of all agents.
The solid line describes the WS economy and the dashed
line refers to the LF economy.
A conceivably misleading measurement of the economies' performances is the change
in average productivity of employed workers. According to Figure 11, the average pro-
ductivity in the WS economy suers a drop by at most 5.4 % while the drop is faster
and deeper in the LF economy, with a largest decline of 8.6 %. The explanation for this
dierence is that laid o workers with depreciated skills return to employment much faster
in the LF economy, while they are slowly phased in to the WS economy. The long-term
20
unemployment in the WS economy is in this way concealing the severity of the exogenous
shock to workers' skills. Finally, the budgetary impact of the shock on the WS government
is displayed in Figure 12. The decit reaches a high of 12.6 % as a share of steady state
GNP, and is persistent due to the economy's unemployment problems.
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Figure 11. Response in average productivity of em-
ployed. The solid line describes the WS economy and
the dashed line refers to the LF economy.
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Figure 12. Response in government nances in the
WS economy.
6. Persistent Economic Turbulence
The previous section indicated that the welfare state is prone to experience enduring
periods of long-term unemployment after transient economic shocks. This section demon-
strates how persistent economic turbulence increases the unemployment rate in welfare
states. Specically, we compute and compare the steady states for dierent economic en-
vironments with more or less economic turbulence. Economic turbulence is dened as the
variance in skill losses associated with lay os. We now let the skills of a newly laid o
worker be distributed according to the left half of a normal distribution with the range
starting at the lowest possible skill level and ending at the worker's skill level before the
lay o. During the unemployment spell itself and at times of continuing employment, skill
depreciation and accumulation are governed by the same transition probabilities as before.
With this denition of economic turbulence, the earlier steady state serves as a bench-
mark case with zero variance. Recall that our earlier assumption was that a newly laid
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o worker kept his skill level from last period of employment. Let us now consider three
alternative environments with dierent probability distributions for skills of newly laid o
workers, as depicted in Figure 13. The graph is drawn for a worker who had attained the
highest skill level of 3 before being laid o. The same distributions apply to a worker with
another skill level so long as we rescale the range so that it ends at that particular worker's
skill level before the lay o. The exact distributions in Figure 13 are obtained by taking
the left side of a normal distribution that is conned to and centered on the unit interval.
The solid, dotted, and dashed lines correspond to variances of :010, :015, and :0175, re-
spectively. The left halves of these distributions are then normalized to integrate to one.
Finally, since there are only a discrete number of skill levels in the model, the distributions
in Figure 13 are transformed into step functions for each kind of laid o workers.
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Figure 13. The probability distribution of a worker's
skills immediately after a lay o. The range starts
at the lowest skill level of 1 and ends at the worker's
skill level before the lay o. (The current graph is
drawn for a worker who had attained the highest
skill level of 3 before the lay o.) The solid line,
dotted line, and dashed line refer to dierent de-
grees of economic turbulence indexed by a variance
of :010, :015, and :0175, respectively.
Table 3 reports the steady states for the WS economy and the LF economy when
assuming alternative degrees of economic turbulence. The unemployment response to
increased economic turbulence is strikingly dierent in the two economies. The steady
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states in the LF economy are associated with a slightly lower unemployment rate when
economic turbulence increases, i.e., when the variance of skill losses for laid o worker
increases. The primary explanation for this is that the greater loss of skills among laid
o workers, who have typically accumulated the highest level of skills before the lay o,
causes more unemployed workers to end up in the middle skill range where reservation
wages are the lowest as indicated in Figure 4. In contrast, the unemployment rate in the
WS economy rises sharply in response to increased economic turbulence. The explanation
for this is two-fold. First, larger numbers of unemployed workers nd themselves with
considerable losses of skills while being entitled to generous unemployment compensation
benets. That is, the incentive problems identied earlier by Figure 6 now aect a larger
group of unemployed. Second, the larger uncertainties associated with skill accumulation
and increased taxes make it even less attractive for an unemployed worker to look for and
accept a job, especially if he is currently receiving generous unemployment compensation.
As a result, these unemployed workers choose to lower their search intensities and raise
their reservation wages. This exacerbates the economy's unemployment problem.
Table 3 shows also that a higher WS unemployment rate in a more turbulent economic
environment is accompanied by considerably longer average unemployment spells. In the
most turbulent environment, the average duration of unemployment is 24.7 weeks, which
is more than twice as long as the 11.6 weeks in the benchmark case without any turbu-
lence. Moreover, the fractions of long-term unemployed explode in the WS economy. The
percentage of currently unemployed workers with spells to date of six months or more rises
from 14.0 % in the WS economy without turbulence to 55.2 % in the WS economy with
most economic turbulence. Concerning the percentage of unemployed workers with spells
to date of one year or more, the corresponding increase for the WS economy is from 5.1 %
to 46.1 %. In contrast, the small numbers of long-term unemployed in the LF economy
stay virtually unchanged in response to increased economic turbulence.
Since economic turbulence is modelled in the form of risk of more skill losses at a
moment of lay o, it follows that a higher degree of turbulence must be associated with
welfare reductions. The LF economy in Table 3 posts a 3.5 % reduction in the discounted
expected net consumption of a newborn worker when moving from an environment with
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Table 3: Steady state values for the WS economy and the LF economy with
dierent degrees of economic turbulence.
Degree of economic turbulence
y
0 .01 .015 .0175
Tax rate (%) WS 3.35 5.09 6.67 9.08
Average productivity of employed
z
WS 2.532 2.478 2.462 2.453
LF 2.533 2.471 2.450 2.440
Unemployment rate (%) WS 7.11 8.24 9.93 12.53
LF 6.33 6.09 6.04 6.02
Average duration of unemployment WS 11.6 15.0 18.8 24.7
(weeks) LF 9.4 8.7 8.7 8.7
Percentage of unemployed at a point in WS 14.0 29.8 42.2 55.2
time with spells so far  6 months LF 4.7 4.6 4.7 4.8
Percentage of unemployed at a point in WS 5.1 18.4 31.3 46.1
time with spells so far  12 months LF 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Discounted expected net consumption WS 837.6 807.0 786.5 761.4
of a newborn worker
x
LF 844.4 825.2 818.3 815.1
y
The degree of economic turbulence is indexed by the variance used to
compute the distribution of skill losses at lay os.
z
Average productivity is computed for the 2-week period.
x
The discounted stream of consumption is net of disutility of searching
and working.
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no turbulence to the highest degree of turbulence. The corresponding relative welfare loss
in the WS economy is signicantly larger at 9.1 %, due to its malfunctioning labor market
with excessive unemployment. Despite the dismal performance of the WS economy, the
average productivity of employed is comparable to the LF economy for dierent degrees
of turbulence. The good productivity record in the WS economy actually reects the low
job nding rate among long-term unemployed workers with depreciated skills.
Finally, when trying to solve for a WS steady state with a variance of :018, a vicious
cycle develops on the computer. Exploding government expenditures on unemployment
compensation chase an exploding unemployment rate without nding a feasible steady
state with government budget balance. This breakdown of the computations mirrors a
potential instability of a generous welfare state. The feasibility of the system depends crit-
ically upon the number of workers that has virtually withdrawn from active labor market
participation because of disincentives. The size of this group can increase dramatically in
response to a more turbulent economic environment. As a consequence, a welfare regime
that was earlier sustainable under more tranquil economic conditions can suddenly become
infeasible, and lead to a mounting budget decit.
7. Concluding Discussion
High unemployment rates in the European welfare states have been attributed to many
causes such as insiders versus outsiders, adjustment costs in ring and hiring, lack of
wage exibility, shortage of physical capital, mismatch in labor markets, and insucient
demand.
11
All these alternative theories focus on the demand side for labor while the
supply side is largely ignored. Our paper takes the opposite approach and explores solely
the eects of the welfare state upon the supply of labor. As mentioned in the introduction,
explanations based on workers' distorted incentives in the face of generous entitlement
programs have been rare in this context, the main reason probably being that empirical
11
For a discussion of several of these potential explanations to the European unemployment
problem, see Blanchard et al. (1986). They argue that many of these factors share responsibility for
the current dilemma, but on balance it is their \opinion that a sharp decrease in aggregate demand
is indeed the proximate cause of the rise in unemployment in the EC [European Communities]
since 1980."
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work has had diculties in establishing causal relationships between changes in welfare
programs and the unemployment rate. Specically, the persistent increase in European
unemployment since the 1970's does not seem to have been preceded by any major welfare
reform. Instead, the generosity of welfare programs has been increasing steadily over a
long period of time without any discrete jump at the time when the unemployment rate
rose.
Our analysis suggests that the smooth performance of the welfare states in the 1950's
and 1960's concealed an inherent instability in these economies. In our model, a welfare
state with a very generous entitlement program is a virtual `time bomb' waiting to explode.
So long as the economy is not subject to any major economic shocks, the welfare state can
function well. Workers who get laid o with generous unemployment compensation can
without too much trouble get back into employment at working conditions similar to their
previous jobs. That is, the availability of `good jobs' for unemployed workers counteracts
the adverse eects of generous unemployment compensation. However, at the time of a
large shock, generous unemployment compensation hinders the process of restructuring
the economy. Laid o workers then lack the incentives to accept the transition to new jobs
where skills will once again have to be accumulated. Consequently, there can be a lengthy
transition phase with long-term unemployment largely attributable to the existence of
welfare programs. This causality is hard to detect from time series data because there
need not have been any changes in the welfare programs at the time of the shock.
Our model of ex ante identical individuals who can only accumulate human capital
through work experience is best thought of as a model of blue-collar workers. When joining
the labor force, all workers in our model face the same probability of experiencing long-
term unemployment during their working life. The workers who end up being unemployed
for long terms are ones who have lost considerable amounts of skills at the time of their
lay os and/or during their unemployment spells. The fact that welfare benets are based
on past earnings causes these workers with depreciated skills literally to `bail out' from the
active labor force by choosing low search intensities and high reservation wages. In other
words, our model predicts that workers who have accumulated signicant amounts of skills
and subsequently lose these skills are more prone to end up as long-term unemployed.
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OECD's (1992a, page 67) characterization of long-term unemployment is consistent with
this view: \Most of the long-term unemployed are found in the prime-age worker category
except in countries with rural population such as Spain and Portugal. For example, in
Northern European countries, the long-term unemployed are mainly males and prime-
age or older workers." It is also noted that \[f]ormer manufacturing workers tend to
be over-represented among the long-term unemployed, reecting the impact of structural
adjustment in industry."
Our analysis highlights the welfare state's vulnerability in times of economic turbu-
lence. In the last two decades, the rapid restructuring from manufacturing to the service
industry, the adoption of new information technologies and the increasing international
competition in both goods and services seem to have been major sources of economic tur-
bulence. In the case of internationalization, national economies have found themselves
forced to respond to changing economic conditions in farther away places. There seems
to be no slowing of the pace of this development. Instead, ongoing market liberalizations
in countries such as China, India and the former centrally planned economies in Eastern
Europe are accentuating the need for national economies to be exible and responsive to
changing international competition. It follows that the welfare states of today would ben-
et from restructuring. In designing social safety nets, it is more important than ever to
incorporate incentives to work. Failure to do so threatens to produce high and long-term
unemployment, and needlessly to waste human capital.
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